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No 'Fair Report Privilege' for Foreign Government
Press Reports: Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo
I. Introduction
In Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo,I a South Korean citizen brought
an action alleging that seven media defendants had defamed him by
reporting the conclusions of a South Korean government report
identifing the plaintiff as a North Korean spy. On September 9,
1985, two intelligence agencies of the South Korean government2
issued a sixty-two page press release announcing the disruption of
two North Korean spy rings operating at Western Illinois Univer-
sity. 3 The plantiff, Chang-Sin Lee, a South Korean citizen lawfully
residing as a resident alien in New York City, was among those impli-
cated in the report. 4 The news about the spy rings was a major story
in South Korea and was widely disseminated throughout that country
by the nation's media.5 The defendants, six newspapers and one tel-
evision station,6 which all operated in Virginia and primarily served
I Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988).
2 The reports were issued by the National Security and Planning Agency, formerly
known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, and the Military Security Command,
both intelligence agencies of the government. Joint Brief for Appellees at 4, Chang-Sin
Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-2578).
3 Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877. The press release also announced the disruption of
North Korean spy networks operating in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger-
many). Joint Brief of Appellees, supra note 2, at 2.
4 Brief for Appellant at 3, Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A llbo, 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir.
1988) (No. 87-2578).
5 Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 877.
4 The Dong-A llbo, Joong-Ang Ilbo, Cho-Sun Ilbo, and Korea Herald are all news-
papers incorporated in the United States that republish editions of major South Korean
daily newspapers for Korean-American readers. The Korea Times also republishes for
U.S. readers an edition of a major South Korean daily newspaper. All the articles pub-
lished by these papers were printed within a few days of the press announcement, and all
but one article was published in Korean.
The Sae Gae Times is a Korean language weekly newspaper printed in the United
States. On September 14, 1985, the newspaper carried a news story about the press re-
lease and an editorial. The editorial identified the source of the press release and advised
readers not to accept statements from the South Korean Government at face value. The
September 14 edition did not mention the plaintiff. The next edition of the Sae Gae
Times, however, contained a summary of the press release and other articles discussing
the release. In these articles the plaintiff was identified. One of the articles in the Septem-
ber 21 edition carried an interview with another alleged North Korean agent living in the
United States, who denounced the press release and the "spy story" as fabrications.
The television station, WNVC-TV, is a small, noncommercial, public station broad-
casting from Falls Church, Virginia. On September 15, 1985, the station aired a Korean
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the Korean-American community around Washington, D.C., re-
ported the event essentially by repeating the story verbatim as it had
appeared in the South Korean press. 7
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia granted summary judgment for the defendants, 8 basing its de-
cision on the "official" or "fair report privilege." 9 In a case such as
this, once the court determines that a document is covered by the
privilege, the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove defendants acted
with actual malice. 10 In Chang-Sin Lee, plaintiff failed to show malice,
leading the trial court to grant defendants' motion. II
language program carrying portions of a news story about the press release originally
broadcast by a Korean station in Seoul. The rebroadcast summarized the press release,
but the newscaster never mentioned the name of the plaintiff. Nevertheless, as the on-air
newscaster reported details of the announcement two charts were televised for a total of
II seconds that depicted the organizational structure of the spy rings. The plaintiff's
name appeared in a box on each of these charts. Joint Brief of Appellees, at 6-9.
7 Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 877 (4th Cir. 1988).
8 Id. at 876-77.
) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Under
common law, the republisher of a libelous remark is guilty of defamation to the same
degree as the original defamer. One of several exceptions to this republication rule is the
privilege to republish accounts of public proceedings or reports despite their defamatory
nature. This exception is known as the fair report privilege. See infra note 17.
Some commentators have suggested that the U.S. Supreme Court has in effect consti-
tutionalized the fair report privilege. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 144 n.34 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981) (citing Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290-94
(1971)) (magazine did not libel an individual for reporting allegations contained in an
official government report); Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6, 11-14
(1970) (indicating a constitutional privilege to report on an accurate document of an offi-
cial government proceeding). Although not yet explicitly recognized, other cases indicate
the Supreme Court may eventually provide the fair report privilege with first amendment
protection. See Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-97 (1975) (the first amend-
ment precludes an invasion of privacy action for the publication of the name of a deceased
rape victim); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837-45 (1978)
(striking down a state law imposing criminal sanctions on publishers of information con-
cerning closed proceedings before a state judicial review commission).
One commentator has outlined the elements of such a constitutional privilege. A
publisher would be protected from defamation liability for:
(a)(l) reports of public proceedings of all branches and all levels of govern-
ment, including reports concerning pleadings filed with a court and available
for public inspection, whether or not they have been the object of official
action, and including reports of public, official pronouncements about non-
public governmental activities; and
(2) reports of public nongovernmental statements and proceedings deal-
ing with matters of legitimate public concern;
(b) if the reports are fair and accurate, or published with due care to ensure
fairness and accuracy;
(c) whether or not defamatory statements reported are republished with
knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of their truth, or with any
other form of common law malice;
(d) provided that the publication purports to be an account of a public
statement or proceeding encompassed within the privilege.
Sowle, Defamation and First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privilege of Fair Report, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 544 (1979).
lo Malice is an action committed with an intent to cause harm. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 9, § 611 comment b.
I I Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 877 (4th Cir. 1988).
FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE
Plaintiff appealed and presented to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit an issue it considered "both novel
and straightforward." Does the fair report privilege protect docu-
ments based on the acts of foreign governments? 12 In a 2-1 opinion
reversing the trial court's decision, the appeals court held the privi-
lege does not extend to cover republished defamations based on for-
eign official documents. The court refused to endorse a blanket
application of the fair report privilege, or to consider a partial privi-
lege that would be applied depending on the importance of the in-
formation in question and extended on a case-by-case basis. This
latter approach was endorsed by the dissenting judge in Chang-Sin
Lee and by the only other court to consider extending the privilege to
a foreign government's documents.' 3
This Note examines the appellate court's holding and the argu-
ments set forth in the dissent. Background of the fair report privi-
lege is examined in an effort to determine if the court's application of
the privilege was reasonable in this case. Also the Chang-Sin Lee
court's rationale is examined in the larger context of recent Supreme
Court opinions on libel.
II. The Fair Report Privilege
A. The Development of the Privilege
Under common law, both the originator of defamatory re-
marks 14 and any subsequent publisher or broadcaster of the state-
ments were liable to an injured plaintiff. 15 According to this
republication rule, the law created the legal fiction that a republisher
of a defamation adopted the libelous statement as his own and was,
therefore, liable for it. 16
Like the originator of a defamatory statement, a republisher
could invoke the defense of absolute truth, which completely pro-
12 id.
13 Webb v. Times Publishing Co., [1960] 2 All E.R. 789 (Q.B.). See itfra notes 70-92
and accompanying text.
14 A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another per-
son by lowering him in the estimation of the community or if it deters a third person from
associating with him. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
765 (White, J., concurring) (1985); RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 559.
The elements of a defamation cause of action are "(a) a false and defamatory state-
ment concerning another person; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability
of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication." RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 558. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768 (1986).
15 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 578. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 143 (5th ed. 1984); Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1102, 1102 (1964).
1 Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
836 (1981).
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tects the disseminator of defamation. 17 Nevertheless, due to the na-
ture of the news business the republication rule has created special
problems for the press.' 8 Frequently, news events require printing
or broadcasting defamatory remarks. To encourage the free flow of
public information and protect the news media, the law recognizes
the fair report privilege, which allows the publication of reports con-
cerning official actions or proceedings even if they contain defama-
tory comments. 19 The privilege drops the legal fiction that a
republisher adopts the defamation contained in the original report
and relieves the republisher from proving truth to prevent liability.20
The fair report privilege, however, remains a much narrower de-
fense than proving the truth of an alleged defamation because the
latter defense may be invoked regardless of the disseminator's mo-
tive. No liability is incurred for publishing a truthful defamatory
statement even if it was intended to cause harm or was not reported
in a fair manner. The fair report privilege, however, operates as a
"conditional" defense, which can be defeated by showing that the
republisher's report was not accurate or fair, or the material was
published with the sole intent of causing harm.2' While an exact re-
publication of the official report or proceeding is not required to in-
voke the protection of the fair report privilege, the story must convey
a "substantially correct account of the proceedings." 2 2 Further-
more, a story can be accurate and still fail on the grounds of unfair-
ness. News stories that contain deletions or are edited to the point
that the reader is misled are not fair. 23 For example, printing only
17 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 581A.
18 Although the news media most often faces the problems surrounding the republi-
cation rule, the fair report privilege "extends to any person who makes an oral, written or
printed report to pass on the information that is available to the general public." See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment c; Herbert v. Lando, 44 U.S. 153 (1979)
(Supreme Court declined to provide an "editorial privilege" for the news media).
1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611. This section provides:
Report of Official Proceeding or Public Meeting
The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of
an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals
with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and
complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.
Many states have now codified the fair report privilege. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West
1954 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAWS § 74 (McKinney 1976); Comment, Constitu-
tional Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1266, 1275 n.72 (1977).
20 See Medico, 643 F.2d at 137. The purpose of the privilege is "[t]o ameliorate the
chilling effect on the reporting of newsworthy events occasioned by the combined effect of
the republication rule and the truth defense .... Id.
21 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment f. Once the defendant establishes that
the fair report privilege attaches to a publication, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove
the privilege was abused. The plaintiff must then prove that the report was not fair or
accurate or show common law malice. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 146 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
22 Id.; Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, 459 F. Supp. 973 (D. Minn. 1978), aff'd
602 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1978) (substantial accuracy is enough).
23 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment f.
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part of ajudicial proceeding, or the use of a defamatory headline in a
newspaper story that is not qualified somewhere very near the begin-
ning of the text, may prevent the privilege from attaching. 24
Official documents from a wide-range of both governmental and
nongovernmental proceedings fall under the fair report privilege.
The primary area of coverage includes "any report of any official
proceeding, or any action taken by any officer or agency of the gov-
ernment of the United States, or of any State or of any of its subdivi-
sions." 25  Coming within the privilege are reports of court
proceedings of any jurisdiction, 26 grand juries,27 or judicial-like pro-
ceedings before administrative, executive, or legislative bodies. 28
Official legislative reports at the federal, state, or municipal level are
covered by the privilege, as are acts of executive or administrative
officials. 29 Arrests by police officers are official acts, and reports of
arrests are covered under the privilege. Statements made by officers
or attorneys, however, that are not part of the official record are not
privileged. 30
B. Applying the Fair Report Privilege in Chang-Sin Lee
Because no American court had previously considered whether
the fair report privilege should extend to foreign government acts, 3 1
24 Id.
25 Id. comment d. Reports of official meetings are covered even if no action is taken
at that time. The filing of a report by any government official is considered an action
covered by the privilege. Id.
26 Id.; see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (divorce decree). Gener-
ally, the privilege does not attach until some official action has been taken. Considerable
disagreement surrounds the point of whether preliminary judicial pleadings such as peti-
tions or complaints are covered. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 140 n.21 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981); RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment e (pre-
liminary pleadings do not come within the privilege). In Cowle- v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392
(1884), Justice Holmes stated the reason for this limitation: "It would be carrying [the]
privilege farther than we feel prepared to carry it, to say that, by the easy means of enti-
tling and filing it in a cause, a sufficient foundation may be laid for scattering any libel
broadcast with impunity." Id. at 394.
Nevertheless, the Restatement also recognizes that a final judgment on the issue is not
necessary. "(lt is enough that some judicial action has been taken so that, in the normal
progress of the proceeding, a final decision will be rendered." RESTATEMENT, supra note 9,
§ 611 comment e; see also Hanish v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 487 F. Supp. 397, 401
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (privilege applied to a news story that summarized a civil complaint which
contained defamatory remarks and later was used to form the basis of a temporary re-
straining order).
27 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment d; Greenfield v. Courier-Journal &
Louisville Times Co., 283 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1955) (grand jury report privileged).
28 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment d.
29 Medico, 643 F.2d at 139 (citing Sciandra v. Lynett, 409 Pa. 595, 600, 187 A.2d 586,
588 (1963)); Tilles v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 609, 145 S.W. 1143 (1912) (attor-
ney general report privileged); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (publication of the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights covered).
30 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment h.
'11 The Restatement subdivides the fair report privilege into several categories. One
category of protected materials is limited to official proceedings of federal or state govern-
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the court of appeals rested its decision in Chang-Sin Lee on the policy
rationales behind the privilege.3 2 Three rationales were cited in sup-
port of the privilege: agency, public supervision, and the public's
right to know.33 Under the agency theory, the republisher is pro-
tected by the privilege because he or she is only acting as a conduit,
providing the public with information it had the right to see or
hear.3 4 This rationale, however, cannot support the application of
the privilege when the information or proceedings that generate the
defamatory information are not open to the public.35 In Chang-Sin
Lee, the press release was public information throughout South Ko-
rea.36 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit majority rejected the applica-
bility of the agency rationale apparently because "the information
... was available only in Korea." 37
Second, the supervisory rationale permits the republication of
information pertaining to official acts. The public needs this knowl-
edge to act as the ultimate supervisor of government by exercising its
powers of election, appointment, or impeachment.38 Justice Holmes
used this rationale to attach the privilege to reports of trial proceed-
ings saying: "[The privilege is justified by] the security which public-
ity gives for the proper administration of justice." 39 Under the
supervisory rationale, the fair report privilege has been extended to
reports of legislative and administrative proceedings and to nongov-
ernmental groups charged by law with a public duty.40
In Chang-Sin Lee, the supervisory rationale also failed to offer
strong support for extending the privilege. To justify the privilege
on the supervisory rationale, the receiver of the information must be
in a position to influence change over the source of news. The
Fourth Circuit court felt that the American public had little influence
over the acts of foreign governments. 4' As the dissent pointed out,
ments. Id. § 611 comment d. The privilege, however, also applies to meetings of public
concern and actions of organizations that are authorized by law to perform public duties.
Id. § 611 comments d & i.
32 Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1988).
33 Id. at 878. See also Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981); Note, supra note 15, at 1102..
34 RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611.
35 Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 879, 881. See also Medico, 643 F.2d at 141. Although the
Medico court applied the privilege to a nonpublic FBI report, it refused to do so under the
agency rationale.
3 Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d at 878.
37 Id. at 879. It is not clear what the majority meant by "information" in this state-
ment. Although not widely disseminated, the press release itself was available in the
United States. On the other hand, the basis of the press release, which was gathered by
the two Korean intelligence agencies through undercover investigations, was not public
information in either country.
38 See Note, snpra note 15, at 1104.
39 Note, stipra note 15, at 1103; Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
4o RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 611 comment d.
41 Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1988).
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however, South Korea's status as an ally and recipient of foreign aid
arguably created an American supervisory interest.42
Finally, the informational rationale rests on the premise that the
public has a right to know about matters of public concern. This
"right to know" extends beyond matters involving official govern-
ment actions, and thus is broader than the supervisory rationale. 43
In order to justify this rationale, the subject matter must be of"legit-
imate and proper interest as contrasted with an interest which is due
to idle curiosity or a desire for gossip."' 4 4 The informational ration-
ale offers the strongest argument for applying the fair report privi-
lege in the Chang-Sin Lee case, and it formed the basis of the district
court's holding.4 5 In fact, the majority in the court of appeals opin-
ion agreed that for Americans in general, and Korean-Americans in
particular, the disruption of a spy ring in the United States was an
important matter. "Espionage in the United States is clearly a legiti-
mate public concern," the majority stated. 46
Nevertheless, while the court in Chang-Sin Lee conceded that
standing alone the rationales for the fair report privilege probably
supported its extension to foreign government reports, the majority
found that "[o]ther considerations, however, lead us not to extend
the privilege in this case."'4 7 The court cited four reasons for its
holding:
(1) the three rationales are not as persuasive when applied to
foreign government documents; 48
(2) the fair report privilege usually is extended because of the
"relationship" between the American public and its government 4 9
(The public is familiar with the workings of the government, consid-
ers it open and reliable, and can hold government officials accounta-
ble. 50 Where the source of the publication is not trustworthy, a
greater risk of defamation exists. The concerns about openness, reli-
ability, and accountability led the court to rule against providing a
complete or blanket privilege); 5 1
(3) the alternative to a blanket privilege, a privilege applied on
a case-by-case basis, which depended on the openness and reliability
42 Id.
43 Id. See also Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 836 (1981); Note, supra note 15, at II11.
44 Webb v. Times Publishing Co., [1960] 2 All E.R. 789, 805 (Q.B.).
45 Chang-Sin Lee, 849 F.2d. at 878.
46 Id. at 878-79.
47 Id. at 879.
48 Id. The informational rationale "applies to all matters of importance no matter
what their source ..... Id. The agency rationale fails here because the information was
not available in the United States, and the public supervision rationale only applies indi-
rectly. Id.
49 Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1988).
50 Id.
51 Id.
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of the source, would be too difficult to apply;52
(4) extending the privilege is unnecessary because the plaintiff
in a defamation case must prove that the information published was
false (The burden involved in proving falsity provides enough pro-
tection for the defendant without the further benefit of the fair re-
port privilege). 53
Dissenting Judge Frank Kaufman agreed with the majority that
the court should not apply a blanket privilege to reports of foreign
government activities. Nevertheless, he dissented and argued in
favor of applying the fair report privilege on a case-by-case basis.
This approach, he wrote, "would strike a more appropriate balance
between the need to protect an individual's reputation and the
American public's need to have knowledge of the acts of foreign gov-
ernments." 54 A qualified privilege for republication of an official
foreign government report should apply in this case, Kaufman
said. 55 Like the district court, Kaufman rested his determination on
the public interest rationale. 56
Kaufman's test for determining when to apply the qualified priv-
ilege, however, differed from the method discussed and ultimately
rejected by the majority. Kaufman agreed with the majority's posi-
tion that American courts should not conduct analyses on the relia-
bility and openness of foreign governments. 57 Such an investigation
would be an inappropriate intrusion by an American court into the
affairs of a foreign government. Rather, Kaufman's case-by-case test
hinged on an assessment of "the importance of a particular publica-
tion to a particular audience."'58 Although this "content/audience"
standard would at times force courts to "walk a very thin line in or-
der to avoid violating principles of comity,"5IM Kaufman argued that a
qualified privilege was more satisfactory than a complete ban on ex-
tending the fair report privilege.
The Fourth Circuit majority also buffered its rejection of the
case-by-case approach on the belief that the plaintiff's burden of
proving falsity provided the defendant with enough protection, mak-
ing it unnecessary to extend the fair report privilege to foreign gov-
52 Id.
53 Id. Virginia state law applied.
54 Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A lIbo, 849 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1988). Kaufman, how-
ever, voted to remand the case to the district court to determine whether the defendants
had provided in their reports sufficient attribution on the sources of the allegedly defama-
tory information. Id. at 884-85.
55 Id. at 884.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 882.
58 Id. at 881.
59 Id. at 882. "In general, principle of 'comity' is that courts of one state orjurisdic-
tion will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a
matter of obligation but out of deference and mttual respect." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
242 (5th. ed. 1979).
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ernment documents. 60 Kaufman disagreed with this analysis for
three reasons. First, the court's reliance on the difficulty of the plain-
tiff's burden of proof as adequate protection for the defendant
causes the same problem that the majority was attempting to avoid-
American courts will be making judicial determinations on the credi-
bility of foreign governments. 6' Kaufman explained that in a libel
case the plaintiff must prove falsity, which leads to pretrial discovery
on the issue of reliability. Furthermore, if a trial is held, the plaintiff
must attempt to prove that the foreign government's report was
false-that is, that the foreign government lied.62 "[I]n a jury trial,
that inquiry may be more difficult to control than an inquiry made by
the court under the standard and procedure discussed in this dis-
sent."'63 Using the procedure outlined by the dissent, however, aju-
dicial inquiry into the reliability of a foreign government is avoided,
at least in the cases where the court determines that the privilege
applies.
Kaufman also argued that the majority was unrealistic in relying
on the plaintiff's burden of proof to protect the defendant. The
practical effect of this policy would be to stop the media from provid-
ing the public with important information. 64 "In the heat of the mo-
ment, faced with the prospects of potentially devastating lawsuits on
the one hand and the difficulty of confirming a story's accuracy on
the other, the media party may not find much comfort in the fact
that, if the case goes to trial the plaintiff may not be able to prove
falsity." 65
Finally, Kaufman argued that the majority should have consid-
ered the particular defendants involved in the case. In Chang-Sin Lee,
the majority's singular dependence on the plaintiff's burden of proof
to protect the defendants was unfair. Several of the defendants in-
volved in the case were very specialized, small organizations 6" that
lacked the financial or logistical ability to confirm the accuracy of the
Korean report.67
"o Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1988).
(31 Id. at 882.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 884.
65 Id.
66 See supra note 6. The television station involved operates on a non-profit basis and
has a viewership of less than 19,000 people. Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876,
884 n.5 (4th Cir. 1988). The newspaper appellees all target their publications at the Ko-
rean-American public. The newspapers are U.S. corporations that republish daily Korean
language editions of major Korean daily newspapers for Korean-American readers. The
Korean Herald is a two-person office and employs no reporters or editors. Several of the
appellees, by the terms of their contracts, must either print verbatim the editions of the
Korean newspapers they receive or they cannot print anything at all. Chag-Sin Lee, 849
F.2d at 884 nn.5 & 9.
67 Id. at 884 n.6. The weekly paper, the Sae Gae Times, contacted one of the persons
mentioned in the story before its publication deadline, but not the appellant. After the
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B. The Webb v. Times Decision
Only one other court has considered whether or not to extend
the official report privilege to a foreign government report. In Webb
v. Times Publishing Co.,68 a Queen's Bench Division court in the
United Kingdom applied a fair report privilege to the court report of
a Swiss trial involving a British subject. The privilege, which the
court held should be applied on a case-by-case basis, defeated a defa-
mation action brought against the London Times. The Webb court
held:
If... a fair and accurate contemporaneous report of foreign judicial
proceedings is published by a newspaper in England without malice,
the report is privileged, if it is of appropriate subject-matter, viz.,
matter of legitimate and proper interest to the English public, not merely a
matter that is of an interest due to idle curiosity or a desire for
gossip. 6 9
The plaintiff in the case, Cynthia Webb, testified at the trial of
her husband, Brian Donald Hume, who was accused of murdering a
man named Stanley Setty. 70 While under oath, Webb said she had
never met Setty -in her life. 7 1 The English court eventually found
Hume guilty of a less serious charge than murder, and he served a
prison term for several years. The year following his release Hume
was again on trial, this time in Switzerland for attempted murder and
armed robbery. 72 During the second trial, Hume admitted to mur-
dering Stanley Setty. Hume said he killed Setty out of jealousy be-
cause the murder victim had been the real father of Cynthia Webb's
child, although Webb and Hume had been married at the time. The
London Times printed an account of the Swiss trial, including the
verbatim testimony concerning Webb's relationship with Setty. 73
Webb then sued the newspaper for libel, claiming the report accused
her of committing adultery with Setty and perjuring herself during
the first trial. 74
The Webb court analyzed five justifications for the fair report
privilege, rejected four as not applicable, but extended the privilege
based on a balancing approach. 75 The court said the advantages to
report was printed, the newspaper managed to contact the appellant and subsequently
printed his denial of the charges. Id.
" Webb v. Times Publishing Co., [19601 2 All E.R. 789 (QB.).
40 Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
70 Id. After the murder, Setty's body was dismembered, and his sawed-off limbs were
made into parcels and thrown from an airplane over Essex. Id. at 789-91.
71 Id. at 789.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 790.
75 Id. at 797-99. They include: "(i) the fact that court proceedings were open to the
public; (2) that the administration of justice concerns all persons; (3) that the public
should be educated about how justice is administered; (4) that even defamed persons may
'be better off with an accurate report than with rumours circulating'; and (5) that the bal-
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the public of reporting judicial proceedings outweighed the detri-
ment to individuals of being incidentally defamed. 76
The Webb court, however, refused for several reasons to extend
a blanket privilege over all reports of foreign trials. 77 English citi-
zens did not have a public interest in every legal dispute that oc-
curred around the world, the court said. 78 Evidence rules in English
courts differed from many foreign jurisdictions in that only relevant
evidence could be presented. 79 In many countries, accused criminals
can be questioned about their past lives and previous offenses, a pro-
cedure that considerably increases the risk of incidental defamation
of third parties.8 0 Finally, if a blanket privilege was extended, for-
eign countries might stage propaganda trials in order to "villify and
defame" their enemies. 8 1
Nevertheless, the English court concluded that situations existed
where the fair report privilege should be used to protect the repub-
lisher of incidental defamations. The court focused on the content
of the information as the primary consideration for determining
when to apply the privilege. "If it is in the public interest that some
foreign judicial proceeding should be reported in the English news-
papers, they ought to have a qualified privilege for reporting it."82
The cases cited and relied on by the Webb court emphasized the im-
portance of extending the fair report privilege when publication of
the information would serve the public's interest.83 Privileged
ancing of the interests justified the extension of the privilege." Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A
Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 882-83 n.3 (4th Cir. 1988).
76 Webb v. Times Publishing Co., [1960] 2 All E.R. 789, 800 (QB.).
77 Id. at 800-01.
78 Id. at 800.
7! Id.
8o Id. The lebb case itself was the result of this concern.
81 Id. The 11'ebb court also refused to apply a blanket privilege that was tied to a
geographical limitation. For example, the privilege could be limited to courts of Western
European countries. Justice Pearson, the author of the 1l'ebb opinion, also suggested dur-
ing oral arguments that the privilege possibly could be confined to "genuine trials or
properly conducted trials." Id. He was convinced, however, by the response of plaintiff's
counsel that such a limitation would be "impractical and perhaps not in accordance with
international comity ..... Id.
82 Webb v. Times Publishing Co., [19601 2 All E.R. 789, 801 (QB). The court pro-
vided the following as an example of when the privilege should be extended: Suppose in
an American shipping case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the master
and crew of a ship had willfully failed to make a ship seaworthy. If it were beneficial to the
English shipping and commercial community for English newspapers to report the opin-
ion, they should not be liable in damages to the master and crew for an incidental defama-
tion. Id. On the other hand, a court report concerned with an alleged scandalous affair
between Mrs. X and Mr. Y likely would not be covered. Id. at 805.
83 See id. at 790, 800-03 (citing Cox v. Feeney, [1863] 176 E.R. 445 (holding a news-
paper not liable for the publication of a report which contained a letter defaming the plain-
tiff that had been written by a government official acting under the authorization of a
statute)); Allbutt v. General Council of Medical Education & Registration, [1889] 61
L.T.R. 585 (holding that the publication of the minutes of a medical council's meeting,
which named a censured practitioner, was privileged); Perera v. Peiris, [1942] L.J.R. 426
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materials fell in one of two categories, the court said. Some foreign
reports have "intrinsic world-wide importance," while other material
has a "special connexion with English affairs." '8 4 The report in The
Times concerning the judicial proceedings of the Hume murder trial
in Switzerland fell into this later category because it was related to
the administration of justice in England. 5
III. Case Analysis
In reaching its holding, the majority in Chang-Sin Lee focused on
the status of the foreign report's source over the importance of the
message's content. The fact that the report was issued by a foreign
government and the nonpublic nature of the South Korean intelli-
gence report created too much risk that an innocent private citizen
might be defamed, according to the court of appeals. Even though
the Fourth Circuit admitted that the report's content was of legiti-
mate public information, it held the privilege did not extend to docu-
ments from foreign governments." The court's conclusion is
unfortunate and unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the holding
ignores recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions on defamation that em-
phasize the importance of the content of the message. According to
the Supreme Court, speech concerning matters of public interest
must be given maximum protection. Second, the majority's pre-
sumption in the Chang-Sin Lee case that no foreign governments func-
tion at the same level of openness which the court attributed to the
U.S. Government is a seriously unfounded position. Finally, the
Chang-Sin Lee holding further adds to the "chilling effect" already
preventing the media from disseminating important stories concern-
ing public information for fear of inciting a bankrupting libel action.
Small media defendants such as those in this case are feeling the ef-
fects of this problem most acutely.
A. The Importance of Content
The dissenting judge in Chang-Sin Lee argued that when bal-
anced against the potential harm an incidental defamation may cause
a private person, the content of the message should be weighed
more than the source of the message. This argument gains credibil-
ity when the most recent defamation cases from the U.S. Supreme
(holding that a commission report authorized by the Governor of Ceylon to investigate
governmental bribery was privileged).
A second less important consideration, according to the court, was the status of the
information's source. The Webb court, however, did not emphasize this consideration nor
examine its parameters in any depth. See Webb v. Times Publishing Co., [1960] 2 All E.R.
789, 804 (Q.B.).
84 Id. at 805.
85 Id.
m6 Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A llbo, 849 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Court are examined. 87
Disseminating public speech, even defamatory speech, is at the
heart of the first amendment. 88 The importance of providing "pub-
lic information" led the Supreme Court to raise defamatory speech
to the level of a constitutional question in New York Times v. Sulli-
van,89 and in a number of recent cases the role of content has taken
on renewed importance. 90 In Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
held that "public officials" must prove actual malice before they can
collect damages resulting from defamatory remarks. 9' The Court
believed that editors were self-censoring constitutionally protected
stories as a result of the high costs of defending defamation ac-
tions. 92 After Times v. Sullivan, the Court extended to "public
figures" the burden of proving "New York Times" malice in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, and Associated Press v. Walker.93 The importance of
disseminating speech of public interest was stressed in these two
cases.
The emphasis on content reached an early peak in 1971 when a
three-member Supreme Court plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.94 applied the actual malice requirement to "all discussion and
communication involving matters of public or general concern, with-
out regard to whether persons involved are famous or anony-
mous." 95 Three years later, however, the Supreme Court repudiated
Rosenbloom and held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., that the New York
Times actual malice standard only applied to "public officials" and
"public figures." 96 The Gertz decision reasserted the importance of
the plaintiff's status over the content of the message.
Nevertheless, in the latest round of defamation cases, the
87 See generally Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REv.
1657 (1987). The current mess in constitutional libel law "has resulted from the [U.S.
Supreme] Court's preoccupation with the status of the libel plaintiff to the virtual exclu-
sion of the content of the defamatory speech." Id. at 1657. Contra Comment, The "Public
Interest or Concern" Test-Have Be Resur'ected a Standard That Should Have Remained in the Defa-
mation Graveyard?, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 647 (1987). The Supreme Court's reemphasis of con-
tent over the plaintiff's status is problematic. Id. at 649.
88 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1984).
89 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90 See i fra notes 99, 100 and accompanying text.
' N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. A sheriff was prohibited by the first
amendment from recovering damages for defamatory false statements relating to his offi-
cial conduct because he could not prove actual malice, that is, that the statements against
him were made with knowledge that they were false, or with a reckless disregard for the
truth. Id.
92 Id. at 271-72. See Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 1083, 1087 (1986).
93 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967). "Public figure" status could be attained "by position alone" or "by... purposeful
activity amounting to a thrusting of [one's] personality into the 'vortex' of an important
public controversy .... I d. at 155.
94 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
95 Id. at 44.
96 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 323-24, (1974).
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Supreme Court has once again reaffirmed the relevance of content,
stating in Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. ,97 that "not
all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on
'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First Amend-
ment's protection.' "98 In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,9 9 the
Court also stressed the importance of content.' 00 Writing for the
majority, Justice O'Connor said that because at times it is uncertain
whether allegedly defamatory statements are true or false, the Con-
stitution requires that the "scales be tipped in favor of protecting
true speech. . . . To ensure that true speech on matters of public
concern is not deterred, we hold the common-law presumption that
defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks dam-
ages against a media defendant for speech of public concern."'' °
This clear concern by the Supreme Court over the subject matter of
the speech casts an unfavorable light on the Chang-Sin Lee court's dis-
regard for the content of the message in their analysis of the fair
report privilege.
B. The Openness and Reliability of the Source
The Fourth Circuit in Chang-Sin Lee emphasized that the source
of the report, in this case two Korean intelligence agencies, was not
public nor reliable enough to warrant an extension of the fair report
privilege.' 0 2 This same concern, however, arises in all cases whether
foreign or not in which executive branch officials are involved. Gen-
erally, the basis of reports issued by executive officials such as police
officers or district attorneys comes from evidence that is unverifiable
by independent sources.' The Chang-Sin Lee court disregarded the
supervisory rationale as the reason for extending the fair report priv-
ilege based on the lack of third-party verification. Nevertheless,
courts have consistently ignored this "absence of opportunity to ob-
serve," and held that the fair report privilege applies to executive
branch acts. 10 4 In these situations, courts shift away from a reliance
on the supervisory rationale and rest their holdings on the public
interest rationale. 115 The Webb court took this approach by recogniz-
ing that situations existed in which the public's interest outweighed
97 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
'8 Id. at 758-59 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978)). In Greenmoss, the Court held that in matters of purely private concern, as opposed
to matters of public concern, a libel plaintiff can collect presumed and punitive damages,
even absent a showing of "actual malice." Id. at 760-61.
'' Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
100 Id, at 771-80.
1l Id. at 776-77.
102 Chang-Sin Lee v. I)ong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir, 1988).
103 See Note, supra note 15, at 1109.
104 Id. at 1109-10.
105 id. at 1112.
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the concern for incidental defamation of a third party. 0 6
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's preoccupation with the non-
public nature of the intelligence report fails in light of the opinion,
Medico v. Time, Inc. 10 7 In Medico, the plaintiff alleged he had been
defamed by Time Magazine's publication of articles that were based
on FBI files implicating him in organized crime. 10 8 The files con-
tained reports and conclusions, but the findings had not been for-
mally adopted by the FBI, nor were the reports available to the
public. Despite these factors, a Third Circuit court declared the files
covered by the fair report privilege because the documents were
"compiled by government agents acting in their official capaci-
ties." 0 9 The court stressed that publication of the information
"served a legitimate public interest in learning about organized
crime." ' 10
Finally, the Chang-Sin Lee majority's underlying assumption that
no foreign government equals the U.S. Government in openness and
reliability is untenable. Certainly, most Western nations are as least
as forthright with their citizens as the U.S. Government is with its
public. Relatively few foreign countries have matched the U.S. Gov-
ernment's recent history for premeditated public deceptions. A few
examples are: the secret bombing of Cambodia during the Viet Nam
war and the recognition by most military leaders after the Tet Offen-
sive in 1968 that the Viet Nam war was lost; the break-in of the Dem-
ocratic national headquarters in the Watergate Hotel and
subsequent attempted cover-up by the nation's highest officials; the
recent "disinformation" campaigns carried out by the U.S. State De-
partment; or the Iran-Contra scheme that sought to sell American
weapons to the Iranians in return for the release of hostages held in
the Middle East, and the use of the funds from those sales to supply
the Contras in their efforts to overthrow the government of
Nicaragua.
C. Libel Law's Cold Climate
One effect of the Chang-Sin Lee decision will be to slow the flow
of public information. The majority acknowledged that not ex-
tending the fair report privilege to foreign government reports will
have a "chilling effect" on the media.I' Small media organizations
such as those involved in the case will suffer the most. Instead of
risking the possibility of a lawsuit, those newspapers may choose not
to print potentially defamatory information. Several of the newspa-
106 Webb v. Times Publishing Co., [1960] 2 All E.R. 789, 803-05 (Q.B.).
107 Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
108 Id. at 135.
1093 Id. at 140.
1 10 Id. at 142.
III Chang-Sin Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1988).
1989]
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pers involved in the case operated by reprinting verbatim daily edi-
tions of major Korean newspapers. 112 One newspaper had no
reporters or editors. At least two of the appellees simply did not
have the resources to confirm the accuracy of the Korean press
release.' 13
The threat of a defamation lawsuit has changed the nature of
reporting the news for all members of the American press. Less in-
vestigative reporting occurs today than a decade ago. Informative
stories are "toned down" and more often "qualified," which pro-
duces less accurate reporting. These measures are taken to prevent
arousing a potential plaintiff or a smart libel lawyer.' 14 The concern
over the silencing effect that libel suits are having on the dissemina-
tion of public information is not limited to press practitioners or first
amendment purists. Judge Robert H. Bork, who recently resigned
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, stated:
[I]n the past few years a remarkable upsurge in libel actions, accom-
panied by a startling inflation of damage awards, has threatened to
impose a self-censorship on the press which can as effectively inhibit
debate and criticism as would overt governmental regulation that
the First Amendment most certainly would not permit.''
5
The extent of the chilling is unclear, but the current price tag of
a libel defense indicates that the media has a legitimate reason for
feeling intimidated. The average cost to defend a libel suit is about
$150,000, including cases dismissed for summary judgment.'16
CBS-TV spent $5 million to defend itself in the libel suit brought by
General William Westmoreland.'1 7 Time Magazine spent $6 million
on its defense against a libel suit filed by Israeli General Ariel
Sharon.' ' 8 Time Magazine's insurer only paid one-half of those de-
fense costs, and it withdrew its insurance coverage as a result of the
litigation.' '9
IV. Conclusion
The Chang-Sin Lee court's refusal to extend the fair report privi-
lege to any foreign government report exhibits a draconian ap-
proach. The State's interest in protecting parties from incidental
libel should remain a high priority, but efforts in pursuit of that goal
must be balanced against creating unnecessary obstacles to the pub-
112 Id. at 884 no. 5-9.
113 Id. at 884 no. 5-6.
114 Abrahams, 11hy 1.e Should Chonge Libel Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1985, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 90.
115 Id. at 91.
1111 Stille, Libel Low Takes on a New Look, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 24, 1988, at 32.
117 Abrahams, supra note 114, at 90.
118 Stille, supra note 116, at 33.
119 Id. at 32. Since 1985 when both Westmoreland and Sharon lost their cases, the
number of libel suits filed actually has decreased about 25%. Id. Libel insurance, how-
ever, during that same period has increased by 200% to 300%. Id.
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lic's access of important information. The dissent in Chang-Sin Lee
offers a workable test that focuses on the importance of the informa-
tion in question. Such an approach embraces both the concern for
the private citizen and the public's right to know.' 2 0
ROBERT P. TRIVETTE
120 Nevertheless, perhaps the most realistic solution to balancing these two concerns
will come only through a legislative restructuring of libel law. Numerous commentators
and judges have noted the widespread dissatisfaction with the current system and called
for such a change. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 772,
n.3 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 391-92
(1974) (White, J., dissenting); Abrahams, supra note 114, at 92; Mazer, It's Tine to Change
Libel Law, The Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Oct. 31-Nov. 6, 1988, at 29; Lewis, After
Sharon, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1985, at A23, col. I.
The media complain of the harmful effects from inflated libel judgments and skyrock-
eting libel insurance premiums, while libeled plaintiffs find it almost impossible to have
their reputations vindicated through the courts. Both sides have legitimate complaints.
The stagnant process has produced "grossly perverse" results and public hostility. Mazer,
supra, at 29 (quoting Justice White). The major reforms often set forth include:
(I) The prohibition of a libel suit if the publisher or broadcaster prints a timely and
prominently placed retraction or correction;
(2) Allowing plaintiffs the option of pursuing a "declaratory judgment" action, in
which only the question of truth or falsity would be litigated. No damages would be
awarded to the plaintiff, but the defendant would not be protected by the "actual malice"
rule. To discourage frivolous suits under this option, the loser would pay the winner's
attorney's fees; and
(3) Plaintiff could still pursue a suit for money damages following the current libel
rules, with one exception: only damages for reputational injury could be collected; puni-
tive damages would be eliminated. Mazer, supra, at 29. See also Abrahams, supra note 114,
at 92.

